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Abstract:  
The paper recounts the history of Saudi Arabia’s first national oil company, Petromin, 
which was originally was supposed to take the place of foreign-owned Aramco. As a 
result of Petromin’s inefficiency and personal rivalries among the Saudi elite, however, 
Petromin was progressively relegated to the sidelines in favour of a gradually 
“Saudiized” Aramco. As a result, the organization of the Saudi oil sector today is very 
different from – and more efficient than – that of most other oil exporters in the 
developing world. The paper concludes with a tentative taxonomy of national oil 
companies, based on the circumstances of nationalization. 
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Introduction                    
National oil companies are not cut of one cloth. Many NOCs are politicized, bureaucratic, 
and hardly capable of even maintaining their current production levels. Some are just 
shells for employing foreign contractors or joint venture partners. An even smaller group 
of NOCs is technologically capable, well-managed, and run along economic criteria. By 
the judgment of most people in the industry, Saudi Aramco, the largest oil company in 
the world, is one of the latter.1
Although Saudi Arabia is not a country most observers immediately associate 
with lean and clean management, Aramco’s role as the kingdom’s greatest modern 
institution seems unassailable. Hardly a Saudi and practically no foreigner today is aware 
that Aramco is what it is because of a number of historical decisions which could have 
been taken differently – and which many contemporaries expected to be taken differently, 
much to Aramco’s detriment. Saudi Arabia was close to taking a course which many 
other oil exporters took, entrusting its upstream oil assets to an opaque, politicized local 
institution that was supposed to replace foreign-created Aramco. 
In October 2005, a small note appeared in the local paper Arab News announcing 
that the government-owned General Organization of Petroleum and Minerals, Petromin, 
would be dissolved and its assets taken over by Aramco.2 No further explanation was 
given. Petromin at the time had long ceased to play an active role in Saudi economic 
development, its last visible presence being faded signs in the vicinity of some old petrol 
stations. But as incidental as it appeared, the little note indicated the closing of the last act 
in a long and twisted saga which was at the very core of Saudi state-building, a saga in 
which Petromin once was the lead actor, and Aramco its main antagonist. At stake was 
nothing less than which organisation would become Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, 
and – more importantly – who would control it.  
It turned out to be a battle to death. The outcome was uncertain for many years, 
but as readers will have guessed, Aramco eventually won. This paper tells the story why, 
recounting it from forgotten Petromin’s perspective,3 an organisation that was meant to 
be national champion of industrialisation, a truly national oil company, and an 
international refining giant – great ambitions which were, one by one, thwarted. The fates 
of Aramco and Petromin differ from those of most other NOCs in a way that is very 
instructive to comparative historians. 
The paper is part of a larger project that analyses how conflicts and coalitions 
among a small number of princes and commoners shaped the modern Saudi state as we 
know it today.4 The Petromin story is yet another reminder of how contingent the shape 
of the modern Saudi state is, and how many of its features are consequences – often 
unintended – of personal rivalries and ambitions at earlier historical junctures. 
At the same time, this paper is a contribution to the comparative literature on 
NOCs, a long neglected field which has recently seen a number of significant 
publications.5 Saudi Arabia’s peculiar situation of having had two parallel NOCs makes 
the kingdom an especially interesting object of comparison. I take Aramco and Petromin 
as two radically different, but typical representatives of a larger universe of NOC cases. 
Combining my case research with the growing literature on other NOCs, I outline a 
classification and a causal model of NOC development in large oil exporters of the 
developing world. 
 The paper will first introduce the main actors involved with Aramco and 
Petromin. It will then briefly recount the history of the latter’s expanding ambitions and 
role from 1962 to 1975, the age of King Faisal. I will then engage with the crucial 
juncture of 1975/76 in more detail, analysing how and why Petromin was cut to size to 
the benefit of a host of new actors sponsored by Crown Prince Fahd. The subsequent 
section will describe Petromin’s enduring ambitions and political entanglements, leading 
to its eventual fall from grace between 1983 and 1986. The remainder of the paper will 
adumbrate the tortuous mopping up operations undertaken in 1988-93 from which 
Aramco emerged as the unchallenged national monopolist in oil production, refining and 
distribution. I will conclude with comparative observations on NOC development. 
 
The Actors 
Like the history of many other parts of the Saudi state, the story of Petromin is to a large 
extent the history of a few crucial members of the Saudi elite, both royals and 
commoners. Ever since the creation of modern bureaucracy in Saudi Arabia, princes and 
the commoners around them have been linked through patron-client relations: long-term, 
deep and unequal links of fealty. Royals provide access to power, resources and status, 
whereas the commoners provide loyalty and defend the interests of their patrons in state 
and society.  
These ties have been keeping elites with seemingly divergent interests – princes 
and technocrats – tightly knit together for more than half a century. In their diversity, 
these links are reaching deep into the state apparatus. As sticky as they tend to be in 
Saudi Arabia, however, they are seldom simple “dyads”, but rather part of more complex 
networks of patronage in which clients themselves are patrons for actors further down in 
the hierarchy, clients can have several patrons, and links can shift over time, changing 
their utility as the context changes.  
As we will see, the unmaking of a patron-client relationship can have dramatic 
consequences. As I have argued elsewhere, the Saudi rentier regime was under few social 
and political constraints when deciding how to shape its rapidly expanding state between 
the 1950s and 1980s. Shifting individual interests and coalitions in the elite therefore 
were the main force determining how state institutions would grow and change.6 
Institutional change often reflected power shifts among a select few princes and 
technocrats. 
The most senior among the select few in the Petromin saga is Faisal bin 
Abdulaziz, Saudi prime minister from 1962 and both king and prime minister from 1964 
on until his assassination in March 1975. No other king after him has centralized power 
as decisively in his own hands and wielded as much authority over the state apparatus. A 
conservative by nature, Faisal was careful not to rush economic development in the 
kingdom, in the process also putting a break on Petromin’s expansion.7 Distrustful and 
solitary, Faisal relied on a limited number of long-term advisors. One of them was long-
term oil minister (and ex officio chairman of the Petromin board) Ahmad Zaki Yamani,8 
whom Faisal groomed as lead technocrat after having read his sympathetic newspaper 
commentary on administrative reform in the kingdom. 
Yamani was born in 1930 as scion of a Mecca notable family, trained as a lawyer 
in Egypt and was one of the first Saudis to study in the US. In August 1958 Yamani 
became legal advisor to the Council of Ministers, then controlled by Faisal as prime 
minister. In July 1960, having gained Faisal’s trust, he was promoted to Minister of State 
without portfolio. After Faisal had prevailed in his power struggle with King Saud, 
Yamani became Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Affairs in March 1962 as successor 
of Abdullah Tariki, a vocal progressive who had fallen out of favour with Faisal.9
In contrast to Tariki, Yamani was a middle of the road player, described as suave 
and personable, with an ‘aptitude for backing down gracefully when faced with 
opposition from his superiors’10. His smooth demeanour and media savvy would make 
him the face of Saudi Arabia in the international arena. By all accounts, he had great 
respect for his 28 year older royal patron Faisal whom he described as ‘wily fox’, albeit 
being privately critical of his reluctance to delegate authority.11 A rich man thanks to 
Faisal’s paternal real estate gifts, Yamani managed to maintain an image of probity in 
office for many years.12
Yamani as trusted Minister of Petroleum had large patronage resources of his 
own, grooming his own following on senior levels of the ministry. His most important 
client there was arguably Abdulhadi Taher, born in 1930 in Medina to a family of limited 
means.13 His father died when Taher was a teen. Smart and ambitious, Taher nonetheless 
managed to obtain a B.A. in Commerce in Cairo while having to work to supplement the 
family income. In the mid-50s he was employed by the Directorate General of Petroleum 
and Mineral Affairs as assistant accountant, and soon started to move up its hierarchy.  
The Directorate was then headed by Abdullah Tariki, who was to become the first 
Minister of Petroleum in 1960, converting the agency into a full ministry. At the time, 
Taher worked on a PhD at Berkeley about ‘Petroleum and Natural Gas Accounting and 
its Effects in Saudi Arabia’14. After Tariki was ousted, Yamani recognized Taher’s 
talents and appointed him governor of the newly-formed General Organization of 
Petroleum and Minerals. While ranked possibly the smartest figure among Yamani’s 
technocrats, Taher was a more secretive and taciturn character than his boss.15 Yamani 
however consistently trusted him16 and delegated considerable responsibility to him.17
Yamani inherited another promising young technocrat from Tariki: Hisham 
Nazer, from a leading Jeddah notable family that had been close to Faisal when he was 
vice-regent of the Western Province under his father King Abdulaziz.18 Nazer was born 
in 1932, attended the exclusive Victoria College in Alexandria, and went on to obtain a 
B.A. in international relations and an M.A. in political science at UCLA in 1957 and 
1958 respectively.19 He was subsequently reared as oil technocrat by Tariki, who made 
him assistant director general of the Petroleum and Minerals Directorate in 1958 and sent 
him to Venezuela in 1960 to learn about international oil matters.20  
In the early 60s, Nazer was reported to harbor progressive political attitudes, 
having expressed strong sympathies for Nasser. He managed to keep his head below the 
parapet when Tariki and other liberals were taken out, however. Some still suspected 
Nazer of being sympathetic to Tariki, and at least for a while he seemed to hedge his bets 
by being not too close to the royals. He managed to quickly gain new minister Yamani’s 
trust, however, who decided to make him his deputy in 1962.21  
Nazer was described as an impressive figure, but with a tendency to be boorish 
and overbearing.22 Already under Tariki, young guns as Taher, Nazer and Mohammad 
Joukhdar (Nazer’s successor as director general of the Ministry in 1962) competed for 
positions in the energy administration.23 There is no record of serious acrimony between 
them however. As we will see, competition would become more antagonistic under a new 
royal patron: 
It was only when Fahd bin Abdulaziz, a half-brother and senior ally of Faisal,24 
emerged as driver of economic policy in the early 1970s that rapid industrialisation 
became a government priority. Fahd, though not politically progressive, was a much 
more avid modernizer than the king, opening vast new opportunities for Saudi 
technocrats. At the same time, in the aftermath of the 1973 oil shock and of 
nationalisations in other oil producing countries, national participation in the upstream oil 
industry became a serious option in Saudi Arabia, creating new opportunities in the core 
of the Saudi oil sector.  
Fahd, reported to be alert, but a more insecure character than Faisal, had his own 
ideas of how to organize the Saudi energy sector, however. He insisted to Faisal to be 
made chairman of the Supreme Petroleum Council in 1973, telling Western friends at the 
time that Yamani had too much power.25 As importantly, he would bring clients of his 
own into the growing state apparatus to administer industrialisation. But this is already 
part of the history which that will be recounted in more detail, and in chronological order, 
in the coming pages. 
 
Critical Junctures in Petromin’s History: Yamani and Faisal 
1962 was the most important year in the history of the modern Saudi state: King Saud 
and his allies were marginalized and a coalition of senior princes under Faisal gained 
control over the state apparatus. The most senior of them started to build their own 
institutional power bases; all of which have lasted until today, marginal shifts in 
personnel notwithstanding. 
Among commoners, Yamani was arguably the biggest winner of 1962, having 
banked on Faisal as patron. Within Yamani’s Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals 
(MOPM), Nazer was the biggest gainer, becoming his deputy at 29 years of age. He was 
not the only one to move up the ranks, but others were far less happy with their 
advancement. 
A royal decree of 22 November 1962 established Petromin,26 an organisation that 
was apparently based on plans first adumbrated by Tariki.27 When Abdulhadi Taher was 
made its governor, he was dejected: He complained to friends that Yamani had unfairly 
favored Nazer, who was his junior.28 Taher would receive deputy ministerial rank, but 
only after Nazer.29  
Senior personnel of Aramco, the large US-owned oil concessionaire in the 
kingdom, consoled Taher: after all, the Petromin charter gave the new organisation an 
extensive mandate.30 It would be responsible for all exploration, refining, and distribution 
of all petroleum and mineral resources in the kingdom that were not in the domain of then 
US-controlled oil concessionaire Aramco.31 In line with Tariki’s nationalist vision, a 
future role as national oil company was explicitly envisaged.32  
Petromin was supposed to become a governmental equivalent of Aramco – the 
implicit idea being that it could one day take its place.33 These were the days of budding 
NOC ambition across the developing world: The Indonesian government had created 
national oil distribution and exploration companies in 1957 and 1961 respectively (later 
to be merged into national oil giant Pertamina);34 Venezuela set up its Corporación 
Venezolana de Petróleos in 1962,35 and the Algerian regime created Sonatrach in 1963.36  
Different from most other oil states, Petromin was not set up in an atmosphere of 
feverish nationalism. Its inception rather came at a point of time when Faisal had 
clamped down on progressive Arab nationalists in the Saudi government, ushering in an 
era in which the conservative state dominated the anemic public politics of the 
kingdom.37 Yet, Petromin itself looked much like its peers in socialist-progressive oil 
exporters, following the statist development paradigm of the day: run as a state agency 
rather than an incorporated company, with a government-approved operating budget 
rather than its own capital basis.38  
Taher, who remained on close terms with Yamani, warmed up to Petromin’s 
promise. He was given considerable leeway by the minister and interpreted the 
institution’s mandate very broadly.39 The organisation became the main vehicle of Saudi 
industrialisation efforts for the coming decade. Its activities included minerals projects,40 
oil and gas exploration in areas relinquished by Aramco,41 and distribution of gas and 
refined products within the kingdom.42 Petromin also started its own oil shipping 
operations.43
Even more ambitiously, Taher initiated a raft of heavy industry ventures, 
recognizing that the local merchants and contractors were in no shape to undertake 
industrialisation of any significant scale by themselves. Petromin started petrochemical 
projects,44 oil refineries in Saudi Arabia and abroad,45 glass46 and steel47 plants as well as 
power generation projects.48 Although projects usually involved foreign partners, the 
Petromin shares were 50 per cent or more.49 Needless to say, Aramco at the time was 100 
per cent US-owned, and Tariki’s talk of participation had been quashed by Faisal. 
As Petromin was under the umbrella of the Faisal-Yamani partnership, it also got 
to take care of Faisal’s most promising son, Saud Al-Faisal, who had returned from the 
US with a Princeton B.Sc. in economics in the mid-60s. Yamani reportedly thought it 
good idea to ‘teach him business’,50 and he joined Petromin as liaison officer to the 
Ministry in June 1966.51 In February 1970, having established an impeccable reputation 
as smart and humble,52 he became the institution’s deputy governor. He moved on to 
become Yamani’s deputy in June 1971. His brother Sa’d Al-Faisal became his successor 
in Petromin, further underlining the close links of the Yamani system to the Al Faisal. 
Whatever Petromin’s virtues in readying Faisal’s progeny for higher office, in its 
industrializing plans, it seemed to have bitten off more than it could chew. With national 
infrastructure badly underdeveloped and an acute lack of qualified manpower, most of its 
projects seemed to come too early in Saudi development to be viable.53 Moreover, Taher, 
Petromin’s unquestioned supremo, seemed to pursue an idiosyncratic recruitment 
policy.54 Many Petromin employees appeared underqualified.55  
It has been speculated that the governor, who was ‘jealously guarding his own 
preserve’,56 would not tolerate subordinates who were too smart. In any case, despite 
rapidly growing employment, Petromin’s administrative structure remained ill-defined, 
with Taher maximizing control over operations.57 The organisation’s development 
reflected a general pattern of politicized or cronyist recruitment in the majority of 
developing country NOCs which, depending on the system, tended to serve the political 
needs of military elites, ruling family cronies, or powerful oil workers’ unions (in the 
extreme case of Mexico’s PEMEX leading to the sale of jobs by union bosses, known as 
“vendeplazas”).58
While Petromin managed to build up modest domestic refining capacity, many 
other ventures tended to go nowhere, or worse, end in disputes. Numerous projects 
greatly announced in the 1960s were never heard of again. Exploration results were 
disappointing, and most minerals projects never took off. When Ed Awad, a chemical 
engineer Taher had poached from Occidental, started petrochemicals planning in the 
early 1970s, he did so on a very basic level with practically no data. A petrochemicals 
joint venture with Philips (negotiated by Awad) went nowhere, as did petrochemicals 
negotiations with Hercules.59 SAFCO, a fertilizer venture with Occidental, ended in 
arbitration in the International Chamber of Commerce.60
At the same time, another player with a claim to planning national 
industrialisation emerged: the Central Planning Organization. Although extant on paper 
since 1964, the CPO had been dormant until King Faisal appointed Taher’s former 
colleague Hisham Nazer as its president in 1968.61 Aramco analysts soon detected a 
potential rivalry between the CPO and Petromin.62 As head of CPO, Nazer reportedly had 
direct access to the king, and soon started working on the kingdom’s first development 
plan, which had a considerable industrial component.63 Nazer also started rearing his own 
protégés, sending senior CPO staff Faisal Bashir and Fayez Badr to the US to get their 
PhDs.64 At the same time, he successfully recruited Stanford Research International 
experts to help him in assembling his plan.65 Yamani, although still on good terms with 
Nazer, supposedly did not share all MOPM information with him.66
The CPO threat, if any, remained diffuse: as the organisation was responsible only 
for indicative planning and inter-agency coordination, it did not dictate project specifics 
to Petromin. Yamani’s status as arbiter of oil-related issues remained unchallenged, 
protecting Petromin by association.  
With the 1973 oil boom, Petromin’s ambitions only increased, as the kingdom’s 
unprecedented riches left space for different institutions to grow rapidly in parallel.67 In 
1970, it already had more than 3000 employees in 1970;68 making it an unrivalled 
industrial behemoth in a still deeply underdeveloped country. After 1973, refining and 
petrochemical plants in the billion dollar range were negotiated with Mitsubishi,69 
Shell,70, Dow and Mobil.71 Large steel mills were planned with BHP and Marcona,72 and 
a gigantic gas gathering and liquefaction project was envisaged for the Eastern 
Province.73 Plans for a trans-Arabian oil pipeline to a new industrial complex at the Red 
Sea port of Yanbu were agreed with Mobil in 1974.74  
Petromin also undertook the marketing of growing amounts of crude made 
available by Aramco in the course of “participation” negotiations.75 The latter seemed to 
move the organisation closer to an ambition it had developed after the regional climate 
had become decidedly anti-Western in 1967: a direct stake in upstream operations, that is 
in Aramco’s core turf – arguably Petromin’s original raison d’être. Soon after the June 
war, Yamani had announced that Petromin was seeking a stake in Aramco.76
King Faisal, the main restraining force on unbridled development spending, was 
surprisingly killed by a nephew in March 1975. With him out of the picture, Saudi Arabia 
seemed to be headed for a development rush under zealous modernizer Fahd, who 
became Crown Prince and was given wide administrative leeway by new King Khaled. In 
January 1975, the Petromin board had approved a 13 billion dollar development program 
for the 1975-1980 period.77 Its detailed development plan for the period was cheekily 
announced one week before the Council of Ministers ratified the CPO’s five year plan in 
May.78 Unsurprisingly, the numbers bandied about by Fahd, Yamani and Nazer were at 
variance, as MOPM, Petromin and CPO operated with little coordination.79
The Petromin plan tackled every conceivable sector of industry: refining, 
gathering and liquefication of gas, mining, petrochemicals, fertilizers, iron, steel, 
aluminium manufacture for local and export markets, as well as transport and distribution 
of various petroleum products. The flagship projects were three (potentially four) large 
export refineries, and up to seven ethylene-based petrochemical plants, mostly on joint-
venture basis.80
In practice, Petromin still had not got far by the mid-70s.81 Its international 
negotiation partners pointed out that most of the large ventures would only be marginally 
economic. Petromin seemed to have no conception of the magnitude of potential 
problems and bottlenecks and relied on a faulty assumption of unlimited gas supplies.82 
Shipping refined products would be expensive – an issue Petromin planners never 
seemed to come to grips with – and Petromin lacked capital to build up distribution 
networks in consumer countries.83  
 
Turn of the Tide in 1975 
None of this was worse than the teething problems of other national oil companies, which 
have tended to be overambitious, politicized and lacking in administrative capacity. 
Nonetheless, Petromin had to stomach its first big political defeat soon after the 
announcement of its five year plan. Faisal’s death would accelerate economic 
development, but it also led to a significant shift of political forces in the technocracy. 
In October 1975 Fahd helped to engineer a massive cabinet reshuffle in which the 
number of ministries grew from 14 to 20 and numerous personnel were reshuffled. While 
Yamani protégé Saud Al-Faisal became Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nazer’s CPO was 
upgraded to ministerial status. Yamani, himself for a while rumoured to become Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, stayed on as oil minister. 
More importantly for Petromin, however, the new government contained a 
Ministry of Industry and Electrity (MOIE) which was patched together from various pre-
existing government entities. The MOIE claimed responsibilities previously held by 
Taher’s sprawling Petromin empire. An official government information website 
explains: ‘There was the caution that Petromin, with all its potential, should not encroach 
into fields already within the authority of other government bodies or ministries, but 
should integrate its planning with theirs.’84  
The statement is remarkable for its relative frankness, but also for getting history 
the wrong round. It is true that Petromin was a rather impenetrable fiefdom, but its 
mandate and large-scale industrialisation plans had predated the MOIE by more than a 
decade. 
When the new portfolios were negotiated, Yamani lobbied for keeping the 
responsibility for petrochemicals with Petromin.85 Fahd disagreed. Convinced that 
Yamani and his clients had become too powerful, he was determined to realign the 
boundaries. He had chosen an aggressive young man, Ghazi al-Gosaibi, as Minister of 
Industry and Electricity, who pushed for maximizing his purview.86
The Higher Committee of Administrative Reform was called upon to decide 
which sectors of industry would remain with Petromin. The Committee was presided by 
Prince Sultan, Fahd’s full brother and ally. It decided that refining would stay with 
Petromin, whereas petrochemicals and mining would be assigned to the new ministry, 
with all projects transferred accordingly. Petromin, the budding champion of national 
industrialisation, was now effectively restricted to marketing, refining, and distribution of 
oil.87 It had gone through a similar wing-clipping as Indonesia’s Pertamina, which lost its 
non-oil business in the second half of the 1970s after incurring spectacular losses.88
Ghazi al-Gosaibi later complained about Petromin’s (read: Yamani’s and Taher’s) 
obstinacy, which was not ready to surrender anything to another ministry and was the 
main obstacle in setting up the MOIE.89 The flipside of the story is that Gosaibi 
represented a new group of young clients Fahd had been nurturing and who represented a 
threat to administrators fostered by Faisal. Abrasively expanding his turf in a system in 
which ministers generally are very careful not to encroach on each other’s territory, it 
comes as little surprise that Gosaibi never developed much of a rapport with Yamani.90
Like several other new functionaries under Fahd, Gosaibi was from an old family 
of Najdi origin.91 Fahd had actively combed universities and sought ministers’ advice to 
find bright young administrators-to-be, rearing the next generation of technocratic 
clients92 which would be closer to him than either Yamani or Taher.93 Gosaibi was 8 
years younger than Taher, which considering the Saudi system’s obsession with seniority 
probably made for additional bad blood.94 He had been secretary of the Supreme 
Petroleum Council, a cabinet committee which had served as Fahd’s control lever over 
the energy sector and in which Taher was not represented.95  
Adding insult to injury, Gosaibi made Ahmad Tuwaijri, previously a Petromin 
functionary (and also a Najdi) deputy minister in the MOIE.96 Soon piles of project 
proposals were transferred from Petromin to the Ministry, where they were assessed with 
the help of the Industrial Studies and Development Center under the direction of its 
deputy director general Abdulaziz Zamil, another descendant of a Najdi notable clan. All 
projects as conceived by Petromin were eventually abandoned or renegotiated,97 as the 
new team deemed them uneconomic or ‘much too ambitious’98.  
The MOIE would move on to establish the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Company (SABIC) in 1976, with Gosaibi as chairman and Zamil as CEO. SABIC, 
capitalized at 2.8 billion dollars, took over the operational responsibility for 
petrochemicals and other heavy industry projects.99 SABIC was set up with a rather lean 
managerial structure and incorporated as company; 30 per cent of it were subsequently 
sold off.100 Gosaibi and Zamil patently wanted to build up a counterexample to sluggish 
and statist Petromin. The latter gets a good drubbing in an official 2001 SABIC company 
history as ineffective and obstructionist, while all other actors involved in the creation of 
MOIE and SABIC (including Yamani) are lauded as cooperative101 – a very explicit 
condemnation by Saudi standards, indicating the animosities that must have existed. 
The newly created Royal Commission for the Industrial Cities in Jubail and 
Yanbu provided SABIC with land and infrastructure.102 Fahd was chairman of the Royal 
Commission.103 His vice-chairman was none other than Hisham Nazer,104 who was 
instrumental in setting it up the Commission,105 thus significantly expanding his role in 
matters of industrialisation at Taher’s expense.106 Neither Yamani nor Taher were 
members of the Commission.107
Nazer had once again astutely repositioned himself throughout a royal power 
shift, this time as a confidant of Fahd.108 He had developed close relations with 
gatekeepers around Fahd such as Adnan Khashoggi and Ghaith Pharaon,109 and soon 
became known as ‘Hisham Abdul Fahd’110 among his detractors. Nazer clearly had 
grown out of being a client of Yamani, who himself had lost his main patron through 
Faisal’s death. Yamani, who had once favoured Nazer over Taher when he appointed him 
deputy, did not take ascendancy of the ebullient planning minister lightly. The dislike 
grew so intense that the two could not be invited to the same parties anymore.111
Taher’s and Nazer’s rivalry had also badly escalated by the mid-70s,112 as Nazer 
had contributed to cutting Petromin to size. As Petromin remained with the MOPM, 
Taher remained close to Yamani. Perhaps to compensate for his losses, Taher became 
increasingly active in private business, setting up the Aal Taher Group together with his 
brother which would over the years engage in lubricants, chemical manufacturing and 
engineering.113
 
One can still interpret the rearrangement of portfolios in 1975/76 as a mere step of 
administrative differentiation. Seeing the scale of Fahd’s modernizing ambitions, any one 
organisation would have been hard put to take charge of all industrializing activities. And 
it was only natural that Fahd would bring some of his own people into government.  
 
Taher still had the hope that the regional trend towards nationalisation would make 
Petromin the default actor in the Saudi oil upstream, on which it now could arguably 
concentrate. The Saudi government had started to buy stakes in Aramco from its US 
parent companies in 1972,114 and two years later Aramco appointed its first Saudi vice 
president. Saudi control over upstream assets seemed in reach. 
Ironically, however, the takeover negotiations seemed to be going a bit too well 
from Petromin’s point of view. In lieu of aggressive nationalisation, the Saudi 
government negotiated for consensual “participation”.115 By ceding company ownership 
rights, the Aramco parents could evade giving up managerial control over upstream 
assets. To create a Saudi interest in preserving Aramco’s integrity, the company 
introduced increasing numbers of Saudis into its management, training them for 
executive positions.116  Hoping to maintain their leading roles in what was one of the 
best-run companies in the Middle East, these US-educated Saudis evolved to be the most 
committed anti-Petromin group in the kingdom.117 In all of OPEC, this group seems 
comparable only to the PDVSA oil executives in Venezuela, nationals who had mostly 
worked in international oil company (IOC) operations before the national champion was 
created in 1977.118
Aramco insiders seemed to feel around 1976 or 1977 that Petromin was unlikely 
to become the supreme oil company in the kingdom.119 As the takeover of Aramco 
ownership was handled relatively smoothly, the threat of building up Petromin as a full-
blown national alternative was less and less required. The issue rather became how to 
organize the coexistence of Petromin and Aramco. 
Petromin still made the news regularly, and the scale of its projects continued to 
grow.120 Mobil built the Petroline cross-Arabian pipeline for it in the late 1970s, using 
more than 400.000 tons of pipe.121 Petromin spent hundreds of millions of dollars on its 
domestic distribution facilities122 and expanded its lubricants joint ventures.123 Three 
large-scale export refinery joint ventures were initiated.124 In July 1978, the governor of 
Petromin was finally given ministerial status.125 Formally, Taher had caught up with 
Nazer. The Petromin expansion happened in parallel with that of other developing 
country NOCs such as PEMEX, Sonatrach or Pertamina, which expanded to become 
large fiefdoms in the boom years, usually run by politically well-connected executives.126
In the late 1970s, Petromin’s international oil sales business was sustained on a 
high level of between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day. A flurry of sales deals were 
negotiated with various states and international oil companies.127 As much of a success as 
this was in terms of assuming an NOC role, it is in distribution that Petromin acquired a 
reputation for large-scale improbity. As the organisation was responsible for contract 
details, and setting exact prices, leeway for discretion and commission-taking was 
large.128 Yamani had previously convinced Faisal to kill ‘princely oil’129, but several 
royals re-emerged as middlemen in Petromin deals.130 Official and actual sales volumes 
were reported to be at variance.131  
The international oil sales business at the time was almost uniformly shot through 
with middlemen and commission payments:132 Nigerian NNPC, Pertamina, Sonatrach 
and others, although operating in different political environments, all tended to “cut in” 
powerful players in their deals.133 Nonetheless, Petromin’s intransparency, and Taher’s 
own increasing wealth, gave ammunition to Petromin’s critics. In 1979, Petromin gained 
international notoriety when it was reported that Italian state oil company ENI agreed to 
pay a 115 million dollar commission for an oil supply contract. More than half the money 
was to be paid to Italian politicians and the rest to Saudi officials, among them Petromin 
functionaries.134 As a government-to-government contract was at stake, the Saudi 
government felt exposed.135 Similar deals involving other West European customers were 
rumoured or exposed briefly afterwards. An oil sales deal with West German Avia 
involved sales of 100.000 barrels/day, and a variety of commissions: 17 cents per barrel 
for Yamani (who could rely on Taher to flesh out the details), a slightly smaller cut for 
Taher, and a much larger one – possibly a dollar – for a senior prince.136
Although Aramco had its own corruption scandal in 1977/78 – on a gas gathering 
project originally conceived by Petromin137 – this came to be seen as an exception, and 
was dealt with by dumping chairman Frank Jungers. Aramco as organisation had been 
widely insulated from local politics. Petromin’s opacity and its de facto role as slush fund 
for well-connected players appeared chronic by comparison. Taher’s reputation suffered. 
 
Defeat in 1983 
It probably caused considerable anxiety among some Saudi Aramcons when Taher 
announced in 1980 that Aramco would soon be taken over by a national company.138 By 
that year, Aramco had four Saudis on its board: Yamani, Taher and two MOPM deputies. 
More importantly, it had become 100 per cent Saudi-owned.139 However, ‘no one quite 
knew what that meant’,140 as the company remained incorporated in Delaware and the 
chairman an American.141 This gave Taher, opportunity for some blustering. In April 
1982, the Middle East Economic Digest reported that he was likely to be named head of a 
national oil company which would be formed soon, despite considerable resistance in the 
Supreme Petroleum Council. His chances were rated high as he was the default candidate 
and a clear alternative plan for reorganizing the oil sector was lacking.142 Yamani 
reportedly backed Taher’s candidacy.143
At the same time, trade journals expressed concern that a merger with Petromin 
could affect the efficiency of Aramco. Petromin, as was delicately put, had ‘developed 
along more traditional Saudi lines’144. By the early 80s, it had grown to a bureaucratic 
behemoth, planning to employ a further 12.000 staff by 1985.145 Most of its operations 
did not turn a profit, and the completion of its large refinery projects was delayed time 
and again. 
Taher’s moment of near glory was rather brief. In August 1982, speculations were 
reported that Aramco would be allowed keep more autonomy146 – which probably had 
been the (unreported) default scenario since about 1977. Fahd was sitting out the difficult 
decision of how to concretely organize Saudi control over Aramco, but he was unlikely to 
have seriously considered giving the supreme job to Taher. 
In November 1983, Ali Naimi was appointed president of Aramco, having 
previously been executive vice president oil and gas affairs.147 Naimi was a quintessential 
Aramco-reared oil functionary, having been an employee of the company since the tender 
age of 11, and having been sent to the US to study on an Aramco scholarship. While 
American John Kelberer remained chairman and CEO, the Saudization of senior ranks 
within Aramco allowed the Saudi government to sustain its structure as enclave 
institution.148 Further questions of reorganisation were effectively postponed. Different 
from many other oil states, in politically quiescent Saudi Arabia there was no public 
pressure towards nationalisation, making the cocooning of Western corporate structures 
politically palatable. 
It is likely that senior Aramco management would have created a political crisis if 
the company had been forced to swallow the ‘poison pill’ of merging with Petromin, or 
of ceding any control over company strategy.149 Saudi Aramcons worked as a domestic 
lobby group similar to the “Agropet” association of Venezuelan oil managers that 
successfully fought for a conservation of IOC managerial structures at the inception of 
PDVSA in 1977 (a victory that would prove less permanent than in the Saudi case).150
 
Although the eventual shape of Aramco as national Saudi oil company remained unclear, 
by 1983 everyone with a more than fleeting interest in Saudi oil recognized that Petromin 
was, once again, out of the game.  
  
Having benefited from ever growing development budgets during the oil boom decade, 
Petromin remained a vast organisation. Although Aramco also operated a large refinery 
at Ras Tanura, Petromin still was supposed to be the main Saudi refiner and marketer. 
Three huge export refineries with a total capacity of 1.3 million barrels/day were being 
built with Mobil, Shell and Greek Petrola.151 Due to a restrictive petroleum pricing 
policy, Petromin also had to step in as the main operator of Saudi gas stations (opening 
another avenue for Taher’s own business interests).152  
The oil crunch after 1982 by default increased Petromin’s share in the 
international marketing of Saudi oil. Public diplomat Yamani and his technician Taher 
remained personally involved. During the lengthy OPEC meetings of the early 80s, 
Yamani reportedly concluded oil sales deals with advance knowledge of newly agreed 
prices, operating through a company registered in Gibraltar called “Evergreen”. Together 
with a second-generation royal, Yamani and Taher were major stakeholders in the Saudi-
European Bank in Paris, which was used mainly for recycling oil rents.153 Taher, who 
through his managerial position was more involved in the nitty-gritty of rent-seeking than 
Yamani, was also known for hiring barges to transport unaccounted oil to tankers waiting 
offshore (a practice still widespread in Nigeria).154  
Much of this might have been tolerated as royals were often involved to gain 
political cover – or would even initiate oil sales deals as in the case of the oil for planes 
swap in 1984, when Petromin was ordered to sell 34 million barrels of oil to pay for 10 
Boeing 747s.155
But there were other areas in which the smaller size of oil exports and income 
made itself felt more painfully: with declining oil revenues, Petromin faced problems in 
its expensive refining ventures, where enduring problems of waste and politicized 
planning became glaringly obvious. Petromin’s refinery project with Petrola at the Red 
Sea port of Rabigh in particular became an ‘extremely expensive mess’156 and an emblem 
of everything that can go wrong in state-led industrialisation. 
The main player on the Greek side was Petrola owner John S. Latsis, who had a 
history of business with Taher157 and was reported to enjoy privileged access to him.158 
Shipping magnate Latsis also made sure to woo Fahd, who became king in June 1982, by 
designing large private yachts for him. Rabigh would become Fahd’s ‘pet project’159. 
Among industry insider, Rabigh was generally considered a ‘lousy deal’, with Latsis 
overcharging for a technologically unsophisticated plant.160 The refinery suffered from 
endless construction delays and cost overruns and would not start production until 
1990.161 Against the background of oil crash-induced austerity in the mid-1980s, it killed 
Petromin’s credibility as refining company. The output of refined products had only 
increased from 226,000 to 349,000 barrels per day between 1970 and 1984, a negligible 
increase compared to the resources poured into Petromin.162
The collapse of the oil price in 1985/86 also killed something else for good: Zaki 
Yamani’s career. Fahd, long trying to circumscribe the oil minister’s influence, took 
Saudi Arabia’s failure to maintain OPEC discipline as reason to relieve him of his duties 
on 29 October 1986. Yamani learned of his dismissal on TV. 
 
Cleaning Up: 1986-93 
Fahd’s loyal client Hisham Nazer had been rumoured as Yamani’s successor as early as 
1983.163 In 1986 his turn had come. Abdulhadi Taher’s long-time patron was replaced by 
one of his worst rivals. Nazer had become Taher’s boss. 
Nazer initially was appointed on an interim basis, which led some observers to 
speculate that Taher might actually be in the ascendancy.164 In December however, in the 
middle of an OPEC meeting, Taher was sacked. Nazer got his permanent appointment 
briefly afterwards.165 In April 1987, both Yamani and Taher were removed from the 
Aramco board.166 Taher was succeeded by his deputy Jamal Jawa, who himself resigned 
a few months later. 
After oil price had somewhat stabilized, Nazer tackled the tortuous reorganisation 
of the oil sector which would finally lead to the death of Petromin. The meandering path 
the remake took is testament to the stickiness of institutions in Saudi Arabia, even those 
which have outlived their political purpose.  
In November 1988, a royal decree finally created “Saudi Aramco”, which was to 
own and operate the former Aramco assets.167 Nazer became its first Saudi chairman.168 
The king also set up a Supreme Council for the company, chaired by himself, which 
would approve the Saudi Aramco’s 5-year plans and annual reports as well as appoint the 
company’s president at the recommendation of its board of directors.169  
Next to senior Saudis, the board still contained former US oil executives and 
bankers, in effect preserving most of Aramco’s existing setup – a unique structure among 
large non-Western NOCs.170 Headed mostly by Saudis who had been reared into 
American-style management, Saudi Aramco retained extensive operational autonomy. 
Any deeper bureaucratic intervention, the bugbear of Aramco’s Saudi management, was 
averted.171 Aramco structures had been definitely cocooned under the king’s and Nazer’s 
supervision. The process is most comparable to the smooth phasing in of PDVSA in 
Venezuela through ‘service agreements’ with the old IOCs, which allowed their main 
upstream ventures to be preserved within PDVSA. Aramcons tend to say that their 
company was ‘purchased commercially’, not ‘nationalized’.172
1988 also saw the formation of Petrolube and Luberef under the MOPM, which 
consolidated Petromin’s diverse lubricants businesses. Briefly afterwards, the Saudi 
Arabian Marketing and Refining Company, Samarec, was created as a shell for 
reorganizing Petromin’s ‘Byzantine’173 refining operations (previous attempts to engineer 
a privatisation of Petromin had faltered, as the company proved impossible to value 
commercially174).175 Petromin continued to formally exist as SAMAREC’s holding 
company.  
Petromin had become a practically headless entity headed by an interim governor. 
Nonetheless, its sprawling apparatus was not easily reorganized, and Nazer – its ex 
officio chairman – was unable to position his people as swiftly as he wished. The 
restructuring was hampered by a shortage of skilled manpower, mid-level resistance and 
the sheer size of Petromin’s badly inefficient operations.176 Samarec and Petrolube 
proved to be only intermediate steps of restructuring, a kind of temporary scaffolding for 
the eventual dismantlement of the Petromin legacy. 
While Samarec lasted, however, Nazer seems to have used it to build his own 
empire. A Hijazi client of his, Hussain Linjawi, was put in charge of the new body and 
started spending large amounts on salaries, offices and office services (in one deal alone, 
Samarec reportedly rented 600 Lexuses).177 As Samarec was incorporated as company, it 
actually had even more independence in hiring and spending than Petromin.178 A bloated 
apparatus itself, it failed to streamline Petromin assets or turn a profit. A ‘cold war’ 
between Samarec and Aramco set in, as Aramco was opposed to a politicized 
downstream entity that would provide negative returns on its oil.179 Samarec lingered. 
The 1990/91 Gulf war accelerated developments. Saudi Arabia’s contribution to 
the allied war effort consisted to a significant degree of jet fuel provided to the US for 
free, produced by Samarec refineries.180 In the meantime, domestic fuel was sold for 
hardly more than production costs, preventing Samarec from turning a profit.  
Nazer begged the king to raise fuel prices so that Samarec could become viable. 
After the war, however, cautious Fahd encountered organized political opposition for the 
first time in his tenure. He was in no mood to squeeze Saudi consumers. In a traditional 
gesture of paternal largesse, he instead lowered domestic gasoline and utility prices in 
1992. 
Samarec was effectively bankrupt, owing Aramco large amounts of money for the 
crude the latter had supplied to its refineries.181 It could not even cover its operating 
costs. As a consequence, in June 1993, Fahd decreed that the Samarec mongrel – which 
had never been formally incorporated – be dissolved and its assets taken over by 
Aramco.182 This elegantly solved the debt problem183 and made Aramco what Petromin 
was originally meant to become: the sole actor in the Saudi oil sector.  
As per Fahd’s decree, Saudi Aramco's absorption of Samarec was to be complete 
before mid-1994. Until then Samarec's 12,000 staff members would either receive 
standard Aramco employment contracts, after passing tests, or be discharged.184 Aramco 
was given a mandate to clean up. 
How much the company had been allowed to take over the oil sector’s 
management became obvious in 1995: Rather unexpectedly, the ostentatious Nazer 
himself was replaced as minister by Ali Naimi, the quintessential Aramco technocrat. One 
of the reasons apparently was the involvement of Nazer’s son in a refining project with 
Mobil in 1993 that never got off the ground.185
Naimi continued the mopping up operations: In 1996, Saudi Aramco took full 
control of Luberef and Petrolube. Petromin’s remaining mining assets were converted 
into the national mining company Maaden in 1997, with Naimi as chairman. Only after 
King Fahd’s death, however, was Petromin as legal entity formally dissolved. 
 
Conclusion: Histories of the Saudi State 
The Petromin story illustrates what old Saudi hands know, but many political scientists 
theorizing about ‘rentier states’ and the ‘resource curse’ seem unable to recognize: 
Different parts of an oil state can function very differently. The expansion of the Saudi oil 
state in the 1970 allowed for the parallel growth of a very diverse array of institutions: the 
Americanized Saudi management in Aramco, the progressively ossified bureaucracy of 
Petromin, as well as the lean, but local management of SABIC. How these different 
institutions evolved, and which ones emerged on top, was not predetermined. Absent 
powerful political forces outside of the regime core, it rather was contingent on the quirks 
of a small section in the Saudi elite – their personalities, their patronage relations and 
their more or less petty conflicts.  
Relatively minor decisions could have great consequences further down the road. 
Nowhere is this clearer than in Fahd’s impact on the Saudi state qua his build-up of a 
technocratic clientele. Faisal-Fahd comparisons are popular in Saudi Arabia and tend to 
work out in favor of the great patriarch Faisal. Fahd is seen as a less imposing ruler who 
tended to dither in crises and was more lenient on corruption. What often goes 
unrecognized is the institutional legacy he left through his knack for co-opting bright 
young administrators and protecting islands of efficiency in the state. 
Whatever the political motivations involved, it was clients of Fahd who built 
SABIC, which nowadays is a large and highly profitable player on the international 
petrochemical markets. It managed to turn Petromin’s loss-making and scandal-ridden 
SAFCO into a profit-making enterprise186 and has emerged as the most impressive 
industrial concern in the Middle East. Similarly, the Royal Commission for Jubail and 
Yanbu is nowadays widely seen as a success story, having enabled swift and large-scale 
industrialisation, and avoiding the sluggishness of the Saudi bureaucracy at large.187 It 
stands in marked contrast to the politicized heavy industries in places as diverse as 
Algeria, Kuwait and Mexico.  
Finally, Saudi Aramco remains a unique institution thanks to Fahd’s decisions to 
effectively shield it from the rest of the Saudi state. It still is by far the most important 
career vehicle for bright and ambitious young Saudis, its meritocracy unmatched by any 
other organisation in the kingdom. For what it is worth, Aramco also remains an enclave 
of American corporate culture, allowing women to drive in its compounds, and both 
genders to mix at the workplace.  
Aramco has been more consistently insulated from political pressures than any 
other OPEC NOC – including PDVSA, which went through a similarly smooth transition 
to national ownership, but was fiscally undermined by the Andres Perez government in 
the early 1980s and has recently been stripped of its managerial autonomy by Hugo 
Chavez.188 Different from many other OPEC NOCs, Aramco has kept control over its 
operating revenue.189 The company remains accountable most of all to the king, whose 
role as guarantor of the company’s autonomy seems peerless in OPEC (only akin perhaps 
to that of the Malaysian Prime Minister vis-à-vis national oil champion Petronas190).  
Although commoners below him fought out important details, Fahd also took the 
ultimate decisions in 1975-6, 1982-3 and 1988 which slice by slice consigned Petromin to 
history; a great project of autonomous national development which turned out to be 
deeply flawed. If Petromin had been allowed to take over the oil sector, Saudi Arabia 
would look very different today. This is not a merely academic point: While the Saudi 
regime abandoned Petromin, its other NOC peers by and large have lingered until today, 
controlling much of their countries’ upstream sectors.  
 
Patterns of NOC history in major developing world oil producers  
 
 High conflict 
nationalisation 
Low conflict nationalisation 
 
Outcome 
Politically 
Insulated 
-- Aramco (Saudi Arabia) 
ADNOC (Abu Dhabi) 
PDVSA (Venezuela) at times 
High efficiency 
Politicized KPC (Kuwait), 
NIOC (Iran), 
PEMEX (Mexico), 
Sonatrach (Algeria) 
Petromin (Saudi Arabia) 
PDVSA (Venezuela) at times 
Pertamina (Indonesia)  
NNPC (Nigeria) 
 
Low efficiency 
 
In addition to sources already cited, this table draws on: Brumberg and Ahram, NIOC; Heard, 
“Development of Oil”; Khan, Nigeria; Brown and Knight, eds., Mexican Petroleum Industry; Tetreault, 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation; Mommer, Governance of Venezuelan Oil. 
 
Where are Aramco and Petromin located in the larger universe of NOCs? The table above 
classifies NOCs of major developing country oil exporters on which sufficient 
information is available. Based on the case history of the two Saudi NOCs, combined 
with the literature on other cases, I argue that two major questions determine the shape of 
the nationalisation process and of the resulting NOC: First, is the relationship with 
incumbent IOCs antagonistic – usually driven by resource nationalism and populist 
ideologies –, or do IOCs and governments cooperate in the transfer of upstream assets? 
Secondly, is the NOC that takes over politically insulated or shot through with social and 
political interests?  
As the empty upper left corner shows, a conflict-ridden nationalisation seems to 
prevent the emergence of an insulated NOC organisation: Resource nationalism 
politicizes the upstream sector – moving cases to the lower left corner so to speak – and 
tends to give stakes in the new entity to unions (PEMEX, Sonatrach) or populist political 
groups (KPC, NIOC). This reinforces the above point that the preservation of Aramco’s 
American managerial structures would not have been thinkable in a nationalistic political 
environment.  
Conversely, however, low nationalism does not guarantee insulation: Petromin 
was created by a conservative, authoritarian state that suppressed populist and nationalist 
ideologies very effectively; resource nationalism was muted. Similarly, Venezuela, 
Indonesia and Nigeria avoided an all-out clash with IOCs. In all these cases, however, 
NOCs have been politicized (intermittently in the case of Venezuela, consistently in the 
other cases).  
The two bottom corners contain very different entities. Being “politicized” for our 
purposes indeed can mean very different things: elite cronyism, fiscal exploitation, 
political capture by unions, all-out corruption, populist attacks by the regime etc. But the 
bottom line is that the company is shot through by social interests. As a result, efficiency 
tends to suffer. 
It is only in cases in which nationalisation was a cooperative process and the new 
NOC has been politically insulated that reasonable degrees of efficiency have been 
reached. Aramco is the ideal type case. PDVSA in its early years comes pretty close, as 
does Abu Dhabi’s ADNOC (which however is a shell company for joint ventures with 
IOCs rather than an operationally autonomous organisation191). PDVSA and Aramco are 
generally rated among the most efficient NOCs, considerably above their OPEC peers.192 
Thanks to its inherited capacities, the reluctantly nationalized Aramco nowadays 
ironically is the one NOC that does not have to denationalize by letting IOCs back into 
the upstream. Alone among NOCs, it is capable of managing upstream capacity 
expansion by itself. 
Saudi Arabia could not have built up an Aramco-like organisation from scratch – 
when it tried to build local structures through Petromin, it failed. The low level of 
resource nationalism however allowed it to preserve the foreign assets in the 
nationalisation process. As the cases in the bottom right corner show, this was not an 
automatic outcome: Political interventions in NOC budgets, prices, investment, 
appointments etc. are common also in cases in which nationalisation was not 
accompanied by anti-IOC populism. Nationalism is not the only cause of politicisation. In 
many cases, the rent-seeking interests of small elites undermined institution-building, be 
it shifting coalitions of military rulers and senior bureaucrats in Nigeria, or the long-
lasting alliance of Suharto and Pertamina’s Dr. Ibnu Sutowo in Indonesia.193  
The crucial role of elite decisions in the very different Saudi story is all the more 
striking, in particular Fahd’s moves on Aramco and Petromin. There was nothing that 
determined the preservation of the former and the demise of the latter other than the 
vagaries of a few princes and technocrats, in a variable mix of jealousy and 
administrative acumen. 
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